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Abstract
We provide new evidence that large ﬁrms or establishments are more sensitive than
small ones to business cycle conditions. Larger employers shed proportionally more
jobs in recessions and create more of their new jobs late in expansions, both in gross
and net terms. The diﬀerential growth rate of employment between large and small
ﬁrms varies by about 5% over the business cycle. Omitting cyclical indicators may lead
to conclude that, on average, these cyclical eﬀects wash out and size does not predict
subsequent growth (Gibrat’s law).
We employ a variety of measures of relative employment growth, employer size and
classiﬁcation by size. We revisit two statistical fallacies, the Regression and Reclas-
siﬁcation biases, that can aﬀect our results, and we show empirically that they are
quantitatively modest given our focus on relative cyclical behavior. We exploit a va-
riety of (mostly novel) U.S. datasets, both repeated cross-sections and job ﬂows with
employer longitudinal information, starting in the mid 1970’s and now spanning four
business cycles. The pattern that we uncover is robust to diﬀerent treatments of entry
and exit of ﬁrms and establishments, and occurs within, not across broad industries,
regions and states. Evidence on worker ﬂows suggests that the pattern is driven at least
in part by excess layoﬀs by large employers in and just after recessions, and by excess
poaching by large employers late in expansions. We ﬁnd the same pattern in similar
datasets in four other countries, including full longitudinal censuses of employers from
Denmark and Brazil. Finally, we sketch a simple ﬁrm-ladder model of turnover that
can shed light on these facts, and that we analyze in detail in companion papers.
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IZA (Bonn).1 Introduction
We present evidence that recessions are times when large employers are hit particularly
hard and lose a disproportionate share of their employment, while small employers, as a
group, hold up better. This pattern continues well into the subsequent expansion, as long as
unemployment remains above trend, and slowly reverses as the unemployment rate declines.
Late in aggregate expansions, large employers expand especially fast, both in absolute and
relative terms.
Speciﬁcally, we establish ﬁve facts:
1. Large employers destroy proportionally more jobs during and after recessions and create
proportionally more jobs late in expansions (relative to small employers), both in gross
and net terms.
2. Employers that are initially larger have a much more cyclical one-year ahead growth
rate of employment.
3. The higher cyclical sensitivity of large employers holds principally within industries
and within States, not between those units.
4. Reclassiﬁcation of employers into larger size classes during an aggregate expansion
plays a quantitatively negligible role in explaining the higher cyclical sensitivity of
large employers.
5. This phenomenon is not unique to the U.S., and we observe it in several countries of
diﬀerent sizes and stages of development.
We also ﬁnd evidence, more limited in its time scope, that these patterns are related to
excess layoﬀs by large employers in recessions, and to excess job-to-job quits towards large
employers in tight labor markets.
In order to establish these facts, we exploit a variety of datasets on employment stocks
and ﬂows by size of the employer: repeated cross-sections (distribution of employment among
ﬁrm size classes); semi-aggregate statistics containing limited longitudinal information, such
tabulations of gross and net job ﬂows by initial or end-of-period employer size, divided by
initial, average or end-of-period employment; employer panels with full longitudinal infor-
mation. The data often break down the separate contributions of continuing, entering, and
closing establishments and ﬁrms, ﬁrms of diﬀerent age, and are broken down by industry
and location. Particularly useful proved the new Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statis-
tics (BDS), as well as matched employer-employee datasets from Denmark and Brazil. The
1diﬀerent datasets allow us to address, and relieve concerns about, the eﬀects of two potential
sources of bias. The Regression Bias is a well-known fallacy that creates the illusion of a
negative size/growth relationship. We are not interested in this sign but in how it changes
over the business cycle, and we show that this bias is not relevant in this context. The
Reclassiﬁcation Bias generates the illusion of our Fact #2, as employers are reclassiﬁed into
larger size bins as the economy grows. Longitudinal data allow us to assess and circumvent
this problem, which we ﬁnd to be quantitatively negligible (Fact #4).
While this is, by and large, a ‘facts’ paper, ours is by no means a theory-free exercise. In
fact, our approach to the data is guided and motivated by our companion theoretical work
in Moscarini and Postel Vinay (2008), [MPV08], and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009),
[MPV09]. After laying out the facts, we sketch a simple model of ﬁrm dynamics, entirely
based on hiring and employment turnover frictions, which can simply and parsimoniously
explain the new facts. Our ﬁndings in this and in our companion papers suggest the following
view of how business cycles propagate. Early in an expansion, ﬁrms hire mostly and cheaply
from unemployment. As the reservoir of unemployment dries out, more productive ﬁrms ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to start raising wages to raid workers from less productive competitors. Workers
quit mostly from small, less productive, low-paying ﬁrms to large, high-paying ﬁrms. The
growth in the employment of large ﬁrms is fueled by the stock of employment at small ﬁrms,
which takes some time to replenish after a recession. Hence, employment at small ﬁrms
grows faster and peaks earlier than at large ﬁrms.
We now discuss several implications of our ﬁndings. The size/growth relationship of
employers is the subject of a vast literature originating from Gibrat’s (1931) seminal con-
tribution. Firm size is measured by either employment (as in Gibrat’s original work) or,
more often, assets, capital, or sales. This literature, however, typically ignores business
cycle eﬀects. Our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrm employment size may predict its growth, but
the sign of this relationship may ﬂip depending on cyclical conditions. In particular, the
relationship tends to be negative (or less positive) when unemployment is high and positive
(or less negative) when it is low. Omitting cyclical indicators may lead to conclude that, on
average, these cyclical eﬀects wash out and size does not predict subsequent growth, which
is Gibrat’s law. This is typically captured by a zero estimate in a growth-size regression.
Adding an interaction term between the detrended unemployment rate and initial size in the
regression is likely to invalidate this conclusion. Verifying this conjecture is a task on our
current agenda.
The new business cycle fact that we uncover is reminiscent of Okun’s (1973) idea of
Cyclical Upgrading (see Bils and McLaughlin, 2001 for a recent new interpretation), a cross-
industry pattern whereby labor reallocates itself from low- to high-paying industries in
2booms, and vice versa in recessions. Instead, the phenomena that we emphasize in this
section hold within industries and not across. This is surely worth noticing, although it does
not pose a particular problem for our proposed interpretation, which seems to apply equally
well to many industries. It is in fact natural to expect that, if workers have any signiﬁcant
attachment to an industry, for example because of their industry-speciﬁc occupation, then
they should upgrade within industries more than across.
Our facts appear to plainly contradict a well-established set of facts regarding the sensi-
tivity of small ﬁrms to cyclical conditions and monetary shocks. In a very inﬂuential paper,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) present evidence that small ﬁrms, which they argue are more
credit constrained, are more sensitive to Romer and Romer (1989) monetary policy shocks.
Gertler and Gilchrist use the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations
(QFR), since 1958, which is conﬁned to manufacturing. They deﬁne size in terms of nominal
sales, raising the issue of industry-speciﬁc price indexes within manufacturing. The data
lack longitudinal links, leading them to make an ingenious yet ad hoc correction to avoid
the Reclassiﬁcation Bias. Even then, their conclusion that small ﬁrms are more cyclically
sensitive holds, if any, for Romer shocks, which are notoriously controversial, and not for
NBER-dated recessions. Of the six recessions in their sample period, only in 1970 one sees
a clear collapse in the growth rate of sales at small ﬁrms relative to large ones (their Fig.
I), and the opposite occurs in 1982. The other four episodes appear fairly neutral.1 Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (2007) also notice the distinction between Romer dates and NBER
dates in the Gertler and Gilchrist QFR time series, and extend them to the early 2000s.
They focus on the growth rate of ﬁrm sales by size of a ﬁrm’s assets, and do not ﬁnd a
diﬀerential behavior of large and small ﬁrms around NBER recessions, but rather a much
higher sensitivity of small ﬁrms to Romer shocks. Our measure of performance and size
is employment, not sales and capital, because we are interested in job creation and inputs
more generally, and we have employment growth data that are immune from Reclassiﬁcation
Bias. All in all, we believe that the picture of the whole economy over NBER-dated cycles
for the post-war period, after controlling for Reclassiﬁcation, is likely to be much closer to
our conclusions that to Gertler and Gilchrist’s. In the period we cover, since the mid-1970s,
our facts about ﬁrm size and growth are very ﬁrmly established.
The conventional wisdom and oft-heard slogan that “small businesses are the engine of
job creation” ﬁnds some empirical support in our data for periods of high unemployment,
recessions and their aftermaths, which is presumably when jobs are more needed. This
1Sharpe (1994) replicates their ﬁndings for employment growth, by initial size deﬁned in terms of net
capital. He uses the NBER Manufacturing Panel from Compustat. As we will show later, in the full
Compustat panel comprising all industries, over a longer time period, our pattern of diﬀerential growth rate
by initial size still emerges at NBER-dated business cycles.
3statement clearly fails in tight labor markets, when job creation is taken over by large
employers. The Regression Bias is not a severe problem because we focus on cyclical, rather
than average, patterns of job creation by ﬁrm size.
Finally, our ﬁndings may explain at least in part the discrepancy between household-based
(Current Population Survey, CPS) and payroll-based (Current Employment Statistics, CES)
measures of aggregate employment at monthly frequency. The former surveys about 50,000
households with 140,000 individuals, and generates the unemployment rate, the latter about
160,000 ﬁrms with 400,000 establishments, and generates oﬃcial employment ﬁgures. Both
are run by the BLS. The CES/CPS ratio of employment measures is strongly procyclical,
very much like the share of large employers or the relative growth rate of large vs. small
employers.2 This discrepancy in levels and especially cyclical behavior between the two
surveys of employment is still a mystery and has deﬁed all attempts for an explanation. None
of these explanations is based on the evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution. If the CES sample
is skewed towards large employers and misses small ﬁrms, that the CPS household survey is
able to capture, then CES employment will reﬂect the cyclical patterns of the employment
of large employers. When unemployment is low, large employers, which are better captured
by CES, appear to grow very fast. When unemployment is high, the reduction in CES
employment is very severe, in part because it misses small employers that we have shown to
be less cyclically sensitive, as a group. Given the well-know diﬃculties that both the BLS
and the Census Bureau encounter in tracking small employers, our new ﬁnding that large
employers are more cyclically sensitive appears to oﬀer a promising avenue to resolve the
puzzle.3 More work needs to be done in this direction.
In Section 2 we present our deﬁnitions and methodology, and discuss two potential biases
that can aﬀect our results, and how we cope with them. In Section 3 we present evidence
drawn from business micro data that contain a longitudinal dimension and are immune
from the Reclassiﬁcation Bias, and we document our main ﬁnding. In Section 4 we present
auxiliary evidence from repeated cross-sections of employment distribution by size of the
employer. In Section 5 we shed some light on the new patterns by introducing evidence on
worker ﬂows, speciﬁcally job-to-job quits and layoﬀs, by size of the ﬁrms involved in the
transition. Section 6 presents evidence from several other countries. Section 7 illustrates a
simple model of ﬁrm size dynamics. Concluding remarks follow.
2Bowler and Morisi (2006).
3We thank Bob Hall for suggesting a possible connection.
42 Deﬁnitions and Methodological Issues
The main purpose of this paper is to show that large employers are more cyclically sensitive.
In this section we lay out the deﬁnitions and methodology that we adopt to establish this
fact. In the following sections we apply them to various datasets.
Our notion of size is employment, not capital, assets, or sales. This choice is motivated by
our previous theoretical work (MPV08, MPV09), which identiﬁes in a ﬁrm’s productivity and
employment level the two main determinants of an optimally posted wage. Since productivity
is hard to measure, and proposed measures are highly correlated with employment size, in
this paper we focus on the latter. By “employers” we mean either ﬁrms or establishments,
depending on the dataset at hand.
In order to measure relative cyclical sensitivity of employers of diﬀerent sizes, we compute
the diﬀerence in employment growth rates between large and small employers, each taken as
a group. Employers of diﬀerent sizes may add systematically more or less jobs, an issue of
great conceptual confusion and political importance. By taking the diﬀerence in growth rates
and focusing on its ﬂuctuations, rather than on its level, we sidestep this issue of relative
contributions of small businesses to job creation. We will provide conceptual details and
empirical evidence on this point.
Our measure of the economy’s business cycle conditions is the detrended civilian unem-
ployment rate. Again, this is motivated by our theoretical work. We correlate this statistics
with the diﬀerential employment growth rate by employer size described above, within the
relevant geographical unit. We also plot the two series with NBER-dated cyclical peaks and
troughs, episodes which are very concentrated in time and fail to capture the slack in labor
markets that persists long after a recession. Nonetheless, we document that the last three
NBER-dated recessions, and probably also the current one, are clearly times when large
employers fare worse than small employers.
As we have learned from the literatures on economic growth across countries and on ﬁrm
size growth, speciﬁcally Gibrat’s Law (Sutton, 1997), the size/growth relationship is rife with
statistical fallacies. Great care must be taken in deﬁning the timing of observation of size
and growth for individual employers. Does size refer to the period before observing growth,
after growth, an average of the two? Our ideal measure of employer size is one that is not
contaminated by subsequent growth. That is, we would like to interpret employer size as a
predictor of its subsequent growth, and in particular how this predictive power depends on
aggregate economic conditions. One statistical fallacy is sample selection, in that the sample
is not representative of the entire population of interest but is skewed towards employers
that are particularly large or small at the end of the sample. This is not an issue for us as we
5will mostly exploit either censuses or representative samples of employers. A more serious
issue is mean reversion in size.
2.1 The Regression Bias
Let Lit denote the number of employees working for employer i at (discrete observation) time
t, and deﬁne a weighted-average size between t − 1 and t:
L
(α)
it−1 = α(Lit,Lit−1)   Lit + [1 − α(Lit,Lit−1)]Lit−1
Here α : N2 → [0,1] is the weight on size “after the fact”, and 1 − α(Lit,Lit−1) on initial
size. This is a weighting function that can depend on both numbers.









If employer size is mean-reverting, then small employers will tend to grow more than
large ones, as they all converge back to a long run middle ground. This generates the
illusion of a negative size/growth relationship if one uses the conventional measure of growth
rate g
(0)
it = Lit/Lit−1 − 1.
An alternative is to divide growth by eventual size and use g
(1)
it = 1 − Lit−1/Lit, but
here the contamination of growth with size is quite strong. As we will see, for our purposes
α = 1 is probably much more problematic than α = 0, as it gives rise to another issue, the
Reclassiﬁcation Bias, on which we elaborate below.
A middle ground, (see e.g. Davis et. al. 1996) is to use g
(1/2)
it . That is, the base for the
growth rate between times t − 1 and t is the average of employment at t − 1 and t. This
reduces the mean reversion and Reclassiﬁcation problems, and has the added value of being
well deﬁned both for entrants, who have Lit−1 = 0 < Lit, and closing employers, who have
Lit−1 > 0 = Lit.
Let L > L > 0 two integers that deﬁne “large” employers (L
(α)
i ≥ L) and “small”
employers (L
(α)
i ≤ L). Let the growth rate between t − 1 and t of employment at all















Notice that, using the weighting α′, we can choose the size class over which to compute
net job creation (the numerator) by either initial, average, or eventual size observed at any
6given date s < t. This initial date could be ﬁxed once and for all with longitudinal data,
or re-assigned every period, either before growth occurs (s = t − 1) or after (s = t). Also,
we can assign the base by which to divide job creation, the denominator, independently of
the numerator, with the weighting function α, which can diﬀer from α′. Again, this allows
employment to be either initial, average, or eventual size, at the same time s. Similarly for





We are interested in the relative growth rate by size class, deﬁned as the diﬀerence in








and in particular how it correlates with the business cycle conditions at t − 1.
Whether mean reversion aﬀects also the cyclicality of this relative growth rate ∆g
(α′,α)
s,t
is questionable, and depends on the speciﬁc statistical model of ﬁrm growth implied by the
underlying structural model. At any rate, to err on the side of safety, in some datasets
we use both ∆g
(0,0)
t−1,t, which is diﬀerential growth between initial size classes, and ∆g
(0,1/2)
t−1,t ,
diﬀerential growth between employers classiﬁed by their initial size but where the growth
rates are computed dividing net JC by average employment over the period. We will show
that the cyclical behavior of these two measures is essentially the same, suggesting that mean
reversion is not a problem for our purposes. With longitudinal data, we compute ∆g
(0,0)
t0,t ,
where t0 is the time when the dataset begins, for many years t after t0, when the eﬀects of
mean reversion would have presumably washed out. As we will see, our empirical results are
robust.
2.2 The Reclassiﬁcation Bias
Consider ∆g
(1,α)
t−1,t, which is relative growth between t − 1 and t of employers classiﬁed by
their size at t. If the economy grows, and all employers with it, while the size cutoﬀs L > L
remain time-invariant, employers tend to grow in size with the economy and to jump into
higher and higher bins. It then appears that more and more job creation is attributed to
larger size classes, and this diﬀerential growth rate is more likely to be positive. Conversely
when the economy shrinks. This is a bias that produces the illusion of procyclical relative
growth by size, precisely the fact that we aim to document.
In one of the datasets that we exploit, the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statistics,




or ﬁnal size. We also observe employment shares of size classes, whose growth rates we can
compare over time. Employment shares suﬀer from an even more obvious reclassiﬁcation
7problem. When using the three methods, we ﬁnd that the results are similar, suggesting
that neither bias changes our results qualitatively.
An alternative method of attribution of growth to size class is followed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in computing quarterly Job Creation (JC) and Job Destruction (JD) rates
presented in the Business Employment Dynamics dataset, that we exploit and illustrate
below. Recall that JC is the addition of employment positions at all units that expand,
and vice versa, so JC−JD is net job creation. The BLS “Dynamic allocation” method even
changes class assignments at infra-quarterly frequency for ﬁrms crossing the line between
two size classes. For example, if ﬁrm i has Lit−1 = 7, Lit = 15, then, of the 8 jobs created on
net, 2 are attributed to the size class [5,9] and 6 to the size class [10,19]. So the weighting




/(Lit − Lit−1) where Lj(i),t is the size class cutoﬀ that falls in
(Lit−1,Lit), if indeed the ﬁrm jumps size class, otherwise it is just α′ = 0. The denominator
in the published BED job ﬂows rate is the average L
(1/2)
it−1 , so the relative growth rate obtained




This method is also potentially vulnerable to the Reclassiﬁcation Bias, both in the nu-
merator (dynamic allocation) and the denominator (average employment). We obtained
from the BLS also employment by size in each period, so we can correct the latter problem,
potentially incurring into mean reversion. Once again, we ﬁnd little diﬀerence in the results.
We also use fully longitudinal business micro data, Compustat for the U.S. public com-
panies (a selected sample) and censuses of Danish and Brazilian employers, where we can ﬁx
size class for each employer once and for all at the beginning of the sample t0 and compute
∆g
(0,0)
t0,t . This takes care not only of mean reversion but, even more strongly, of Reclassiﬁca-
tion, as employers never change size class, even after one or two decades. We ﬁnd that initial
size predicts growth many many years later, in a way that depends on cyclical conditions.
2.3 Employment Shares by Size Class
The easiest data to obtain are repeated cross-sections of employment shares of size classes.








which is the conventional deﬁnition of the share of employment at time t working at em-
ployers of size in class j, then the change in ejt is an estimate of employer growth for size
class j. When small ﬁrms grow faster, their share rises. However, as small employers gain
size, they are reclassiﬁed into larger size classes, so repeated cross-sections are subject to
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The growth rate of the employment share of a given size class j has thus been decomposed
into the sum of three terms: g
(0)
jt , reﬂecting growth of ﬁrms that were initially (i.e. at date
t−1) in size class j, minus a normalization by aggregate employment growth gt, which drops
out when taking diﬀerences in growth rates across size classes, plus a third term reﬂecting
the contribution of employers that either enter or exit size class j between dates t − 1 and
t. Omission of that third term, which amounts to ignoring changes in the composition of
size classes, is the source of the Reclassiﬁcation Bias: that term would only equal zero if the
identity of employers in a given size class did not change, so all growth and decline occurred
without leaving a size class.
Equation (1) clearly shows that the growth rate of employment shares only approximates
g
(0)
jt up to the Reclassiﬁcation Bias. Nevertheless, we will also present evidence based on
employment shares for two reasons. First, data on employment shares by size classes are
relatively easy to come by in many countries and over reasonably long time periods. Second,
richer (and scarcer) data sets that allow to ﬁx the composition of size classes over two
consecutive periods also allow to compute growth rates of employment shares, which provides
a way to gauge the magnitude of the Reclassiﬁcation Bias. Our results suggest that it is
small.
9An example. Four ﬁrms, A through D, are observed at two consecutive dates, t − 1 and
t. Their employment counts are:
Firm
A B C D
t − 1 36 44 353 1690
t 48 1566 18 723
Suppose the data are presented and organized in three size classes, [1 − 49], [50 − 999],
[1000,∞) employees. The ﬁrst class is “small”, the last is “large”. Then the growth rate of
ﬁrms classiﬁed by initial size is (48 − 36 + 1566 − 44)/(36 + 44) = 1917% for the small class,
(723 − 1690)/1690 = −57.2% for the large, the large minus small diﬀerence is −1974%. If we
classify them by average size, the growth rate is (48-36)/36=33.3% for the small class, as only
ﬁrm A has average size in the small category, again −57.2% for the large class, diﬀerence
−90.5%. If we apply BLS dynamic size allocation, the growth rate of the small class is
2(48 − 36 + 49 − 44 + 18 − 50)/(48 + 36 + 44 + 49 + 18 + 50) = −11.7% and for the large
class it is 2(1566 − 1000 + 999 − 1690)/(1566 + 1000 + 1690 + 999) = −4.75%, diﬀerence
6.9%. Finally, the employment shares of the small and large class are (resp.) 3% and 79%
at t−1 and 2.8% and 66.5% at t, so they both decrease, but the share of large ﬁrms declines
by much more. Qualitatively, all methods except dynamic allocation suggest that small
ﬁrms are doing relatively better, a pattern that we uncover in recessions. Quantitatively, the
results vary widely, but the example is intentionally extreme.
2.4 Entry and Exit: Firms vs. Establishments
Most ﬁrms enter at the bottom of the size distribution in the dataset, and the contribution
of entry to net JC typically declines by size. For establishments these patterns are similar
but weaker, because existing ﬁrms open establishments of all sizes. A natural question to
ask is whether the higher cyclical sensitivity of large employers is due entirely or in part to
entry.
The datasets at our disposal are organized at diﬀerent levels. If the dataset contains
information on job ﬂows and size either at the ﬁrm or at the establishment level, then one
natural question is whether we want to include entering and exiting employers from the
computation of relative growth rates.
There is no compelling reason to exclude exiting employers if we know their initial size
class, as their job destruction should deﬁnitely be imputed to that class. But we will provide
some evidence with and without exiting employers, to check whether the relative growth
performance over business cycles is driven by diﬀerent patterns of exit (extensive margin) or
net JC at continuing employers (intensive margin) across size classes.
10For entrants, the main issue is the attribution of their ﬁrst growth to initial size, which
is zero by deﬁnition. Even in longitudinal datasets, where we are able to classify JC and JD
by initial size, for entrants this attribution is done necessarily by their eventual size class
(the one they have when ﬁrst observed), ruling out a size class “0”. So the Reclassiﬁcation
Bias is unavoidable for such entrants, and may work in the opposite direction: if entry is
very procyclical and most entrants are small when ﬁrst observed, then the contribution of
small employers to employment growth will appear to be more procyclical, going against
our stylized fact. Therefore, we present evidence with and without entry. If we ﬁx employer
sizes once and for all at some initial date, then necessarily we exclude subsequent entrants
and we focus on a sample of continuing employers.
A special issue is raised by the Census BDS dataset, where size refers to the parent
company, but the entry/exit/continuing status by which job ﬂows are broken down is that
of each establishment the ﬁrm owns. For example, we ﬁnd JD between years t − 1 and t
of all closing establishments owned by ﬁrms of either initial (at t − 1) or ﬁnal (at t) size
in the same employment size class [500 − 999]. It is possible that an existing ﬁrm decides
to open or close establishments, while, by deﬁnition, an entering ﬁrm owns only entering
establishments and a ﬁrm that is shutting down is closing all of its establishments.
Here we deﬁne “ﬁrm count” to be the situation where we subtract from both net JC and
initial employment of an initial-size (L
(0)
it−1) class the job growth of ﬁrms that were of age 0
at t−1, that is, ﬁrms that entered between t−1 and t and are reported as having an “initial
size” L
(0)
it−1 equal to their post-entry size L
(0)
it . The reason is that the “initial size” of these
entrants in BDS is in fact their ﬁnal one, that they reach after entering. This convention
introduces a Reclassiﬁcation Bias both in the numerator (net JC) and the denominator
(initial employment) of ∆g
(0,0)
s,t . We denote the ﬁrm-count adjusted growth rate diﬀerential
by ∆  g
(0,0)
s,t . In the “ﬁrm count”, the addition of new jobs by a ﬁrm of size, say, 700, which
opens a new establishment is entirely attributed to size class [500 − 999], because the ﬁrm
existed before in that class, although the establishment did not. We deﬁne “establishment
count” the situation where we subtract from both numerator and denominator the net JC
of new establishments. This excludes both new ﬁrms and new establishments of existing
ﬁrms. The ﬁrst, ﬁrm count is our main focus, and establishment count is just to check
robustness and investigate how much of the ﬁrm count pattern is driven just by entry of new
establishments.
2.5 Large and Small Employers
Our deﬁnition of a “large” and “small” employer is necessarily arbitrary, but guided by a few
considerations. First, if the size classes in the data refer to establishments, then we choose
11what appears to be fairly reasonable cutoﬀs, either 20 or 50 employees as upper bounds for
small establishments and 500 employees as lower bound for large ones, which is also often
the largest cutoﬀ available in the data.
If the size classes in the data are organized at the ﬁrm level (total employment of the
ﬁrm), sometimes the highest cutoﬀ in the data partition is as large as 10,000 employees.
Whenever possible we proceed as follows. Consider ﬁrm size class j characterized by cutoﬀs
[Lj,Lj+1), for example [1,4] employees, [500,999] etc. Let sj denote the average number of
employees per establishment among all establishments that are owned by ﬁrms in size class
[Lj,Lj+1 − 1]. Clearly, sj/Lj+1 < 1, because by deﬁnition no ﬁrm in size class j has more
than Lj+1 −1 workers, and no ﬁrm can be smaller than any establishment it owns. If all (or
most) ﬁrms in a size class are mono-establishment, then sj/Lj ≥ 1, and we call these ﬁrms
“small”. If instead most ﬁrms in a size class have multiple establishments, then the ﬁrm’s
labor force is distributed among many locations, and the average size of these establishments
is smaller than that of the parent ﬁrm, which must be the case if in particular sj/Lj < 1. We
call “large” the ﬁrms that belong to size classes that satisfy the last inequality. Presumably,
most single-establishment ﬁrms do not have a Human Resource department and do most of
their hiring in house, while multi-establishment large ﬁrms have a HR department. So it is
plausible that the former have a harder time than the latter plucking employees from other
ﬁrms, and have to rely more on the unemployment pool. This diﬀerential source of hiring,
unemployment for smaller ﬁrms and poaching for larger ﬁrms, is the core of our theoretical
explanation for the patterns that we document in this paper (MPV08, MPV09). Hence, we
try to present the data in a way that is congruent with our theory, distinguishing between
small, single-establishment ﬁrms that hire mostly from unemployment and large ﬁrms that
own multiple large establishments and rely more on poaching (we will also present direct
evidence on that).
Finally, when we use less aggregate data and compute relative employment growth, say
by sector, we compute sector-speciﬁc cutoﬀs by considering, among the size classes available
in the data partition, the bins that are closest to the ﬁrst and fourth quartiles of the average
distribution of employment over a long time period.
2.6 Cyclical Indicators and Detrending
As mentioned, our preferred cyclical indicator is the civilian unemployment rate, that we
detrend over the post-war period and then correlate with the relative ﬁrm-count-adjusted








showed in MPV08, using the employment/population ratio instead makes little diﬀerence,
as participation has no clear cyclical pattern.
12From datasets of repeated cross-sections, the employment distribution by size of the
employer, we detrend the growth rates of employment shares, as we ﬁnd they have signiﬁcant
long term movements. This raises the issue of detrending method. We use a Hodrick Prescott
ﬁlter. Following Shimer (2005) we use a high smoothing parameter for unemployment (105
at quarterly frequency). For shares’ growth rates, we ﬁnd that a high smoothing parameter
is also necessary so that the trend loses obvious cyclical ﬂuctuations. Fitting a linear trend
makes little diﬀerence in this case.4
3 The U.S. Employers’ Growth/Size Relationship over
the Business Cycle
3.1 Evidence from the Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS)
3.1.1 The BDS Dataset
The primary source of information on the identity, location, employment, sales, payroll, in-
dustry, of all U.S. businesses is the Census Bureau’s Business Register (BR), a.k.a. Standard
Statistical Establishment List (SSEL). For establishments in the BR, information is updated
annually with the Company Organization Survey. The list of establishments in the BR is
updated at every quinquennial Economic Census.5 Establishments in the BR can be linked
up to the ﬁrm level using the Employer Identiﬁcation Number (EIN) assigned by Internal
Revenue Service. County Business Patterns (CBP) are semi-aggregate statistics from the
BR publicly available annually in 1977-2006. They report number of employees in the week
that includes March 12 of each year, payroll in the calendar year to date and over the entire
previous 12 months, and number of establishments, all by size of the parent company (in
number of employees, one of nine size classes), by industry, state and county.
Starting in December 2008, the Census Bureau has made publicly available a set of
semi-aggregate statistics from the Business Register, under the name of Business Dynamic
Statistics. BDS covers approximately 98% of U.S. employment, so it is a fairly comprehensive
picture, not a survey. BDS contains information on establishment-level employment stocks
and job ﬂows, for continuing, entering, and exiting establishments, at annual frequency for
4The Census publishes County Business Patterns aggregate statistics that include the number of ﬁrms, but
only starting in 1989. We ﬁnd that, in 1989-2006, employment has been migrating towards larger companies.
The average size of the U.S. ﬁrm has risen from 17.7 to 19.91 employees. In the BLS Business Employment
Dynamics, average ﬁrm size increased from 20.7 to 22.1 employees in 1992:III-2008:I. An inspection of the
entire time series reveals that these are not purely cyclical eﬀects. To the best of our knowledge, this
observation is new. Because larger ﬁrms are less typically volatile, this shifting composition of the universe
of U.S. employers might in part explain the simultaneous decline in business volatility, documented by Davis
et al. (2008a) without controlling for size composition.
5Visit www.census.gov/epcd/susb/introusb.htm for more details.
13the 1977-2006 period, broken down by location and industry of the establishment, and by
age and size of the parent ﬁrm. To obtain this size, the Census aggregates employment
at all establishments (the original unit of observation) owned by the same ﬁrm, according
to various criteria, mainly Employer Identiﬁcation Number. Two notions of ﬁrm size are
available in BDS: the size of the ﬁrm at the end of the observation year, after the job ﬂows
have taken place, and the size of the ﬁrm before the ﬂows are measured, the “initial ﬁrm
size”, which is zero for entrants. These two allow us to avoid the Reclassiﬁcation Bias and
to calculate employment growth by initial size of the employer, as well as to assess whether
the Regression Bias matters for cyclical patterns.6
More speciﬁcally, we calculate the growth rate of employment in a size class as the ratio
between net job creation — namely gross Job Creation (JC) minus gross Job Destruction
(JD) — over the period [March of year t − 1,March of year t], and a measure of employ-
ment. Everything is classiﬁed by a measure of initial ﬁrm size, as of March of year t − 1.
After computing growth, ﬁrms are reclassiﬁed into their new size classes, and their new size
becomes their initial size for the following period, March of year t to March of year t+1. As
discussed in Section 2, we consider the following two alternative deﬁnitions of employment:
either initial employment at t − 1 or the arithmetic average of employment between t − 1
and t. When using all establishments, the two notions of employment yield almost identical
results, so we will report them only for the former. When distinguishing between continuing
and other establishments, in the next section, the choice of the latter deﬁnition becomes
mandatory. Notice that gross JC excludes, by deﬁnition, exiting establishments, because it
is the sum of all employment gains at establishments that grow in size, and an exiting one
declines in size.
As explained earlier, in the ﬁrm count our notion of gross (and net) JC refers only to
pre-existing ﬁrms, either continuing or exiting. These are not to be confused with continuing
and exiting establishments, whose gross job ﬂows are provided directly in the BDS, but are
not the appropriate measures for our classiﬁcation by size of the ﬁrm. That is, we include in
net JC that of new establishments of existing ﬁrms (age>0), because the initial size of those
pre-existing ﬁrms was well deﬁned and correctly attributed. Obviously, we also include in
JD both continuing and exiting establishments, because they existed at time t − 1 and had
a correct ﬁrm size attached.
To deﬁne small and large ﬁrms, we choose employment size classes 1-49 and 1000+.
Besides being a reasonable choice, we do so after looking at Table 1, where we report the ratio
6In previous work (MPV08) we used another set of semi-aggregated statistics from the Census Bureau
which contains some longitudinal information, the Business Information Tracking Series. This is now by and
large also subsumed in time and scope by BDS.
14sj/Lj, discussed earlier, by size classes j. We ﬁnd that the ratio is greater than 1, suggesting
a prevalence of mono-establishment ﬁrms, for ﬁrms of sizes up to 49, and less than 1 for
larger ﬁrms. The ratio nearly vanishes for very large ﬁrms, implying that these are almost
exclusively ﬁrms that own very many establishments. Indeed, the average establishment size
stabilizes around 60 employees for all ﬁrms of total size above 500.
Firm size category





1 to 4 2.2 2.265
5 to 9 6.5 1.300
10 to 19 12.5 1.251
20 to 49 24.1 1.203
50 to 99 39.2 .784
100 to 249 49.0 .490
250 to 499 53.9 .215
500 to 999 57.9 .115
1000 to 2499 62.1 .062
2500 to 4999 58.6 .023
5000 to 9999 55.8 .011
10000+ 62.5 .006
Table 1: Ratio between average establishment size and smallest possible size of its parent
company, by size class of the parent company
3.1.2 The Aggregate Picture
In Figure 1 we plot the employment growth rates of ﬁrms that have initially less than 50 and
more than 1000 employees, starting in 1979, with NBER peaks and troughs. Large ﬁrms
suﬀer much more from the 1983 and 2001 recessions. The growth rate of large ﬁrms is smaller
than that of small ﬁrms in the ﬁrst few years after each of the three NBER troughs, including
1992-1995, and larger in the few years preceding each of the three NBER peaks. The 1991
recession appears to diﬀer, but this is mostly a time aggregation eﬀect, as large ﬁrms do fare
worse in 1992 (and beyond). The NBER trough was in March 1991, which is exactly the
month to which BDS observations refer for the year. In fact, if we compute two-year growth
rates 1990-1992, the diﬀerence disappears, and reverses in 1990-1993, when large ﬁrms once
again grow less. This picture corroborates only in part the common wisdom that small
businesses are the engine of (net) job creation. As mentioned earlier, this statement has
been amply criticized (see for example Davis et al., 1996) as subject to Galton’s regression
fallacy, which is known to generate a negative size-growth relationship. While this fallacy is
almost certain to aﬀect the relative levels of net JC by initial size also in our BDS data, it
15is less likely to have a clear impact on their relative cyclical patterns, as this would require
that idiosyncratic, ﬁrm-level shocks become much more mean-reverting in aggregate slumps,
which is fairly implausible. At any rate, small ﬁrms appear to create more jobs as a fraction
of their employment only when unemployment is high (which is, arguably, when jobs are
most needed). In terms of absolute number of jobs added, large ﬁrms dominate at nearly all
times, because they employ a larger fraction of employment to begin with.
Figure 2 decomposes the diﬀerential (initially large minus small ﬁrms) net JC rates of
Figure 1 into diﬀerential gross JC and JD rates. The action is all on the JD side in 1983,
namely, large employers that contracted shed a much larger proportion of their payroll than
contracting small ﬁrms. Less dramatic but qualitatively similar is the pattern after the 1991
recession, with a lag of a year or so. In 2001 both JC and JD contribute to the worse
performance of large employers. In between recessions, it is a surge in gross JC by large
ﬁrms late in expansions to account for their better performance in those phases, including
again in 2005-2006. Overall, these ﬁgures indicate the following:
Fact 1. Large employers destroy proportionally more jobs during and after re-
cessions and create proportionally more jobs late in expansions (relative to small
employers), both in gross and net terms.
To better visualize the cyclical eﬀect, we take the diﬀerence in growth rates between (ini-
tially) large and small ﬁrms. If this diﬀerential growth rate is procyclical, as we will ﬁnd,
then large ﬁrms are more cyclically sensitive: they shed proportionally more of their employ-
ment in recessions and gain more in booms. Because our underlying theoretical hypothesis
emphasizes the role of unemployment and labor market tightness as a cyclical indicator, and
because NBER dates may be marking cyclical slumps and recoveries too narrowly, Figure
3 reports the relative growth (net JC) rate against the detrended one-year lagged civilian
unemployment rate. We lag unemployment as we envision it as predetermined and con-
tributing to cause growth of employment between t−1 and t. Here is one central ﬁnding of
this paper: as visually clear and conﬁrmed by the -0.6 correlation,
Fact 2. Employers that are initially larger have a much more cyclical one-year
ahead growth rate of employment.
An alternative way of cutting the data and focusing on recession is an “episode analysis”. For
each of the three complete business cycles in the time span, we renormalize time at 0 in the
corresponding NBER trough year, and plot it in a worm graph for several years before and
after that trough, without any prior detrending. We center the 1989-1995 episode in 1992,



































Solid = Net job creation rate, large firms, Dash = Net job creation rate, small firms.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.






























Solid = Differential gross job creation, Dash = Differential gross job destruction.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.



































Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.

























Differential average firm size growth, large minus small, around NBER troughs.
Size categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Date zero in 1983, 1992 and 2002.
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 4: Diﬀerential growth, around three consecutive NBER troughs
growth from March 1990 to March 1991. It is quite clear from Figure 4 that recessions are
times when initially large employers suﬀer a (proportionally) much larger loss of employment.
18Before we move on to a more thorough analysis of the higher cyclical sensitivity of large
employers (the basic fact listed as Fact 2 above), we should point out the following two issues
about the BDS data. First, while BDS begins in 1977 (that is, with job ﬂows between 1976
and 1977), it shows some troubling discrepancies with comparable, well-proven datasets in
the ﬁrst two years, 1977 and 1978. In particular, net JC in BDS in 1977-1978 is 2% higher in
BDS than in the Census Bureau County Business Pattern (CBP) data.7 Afterwards, the two
series (BDS and CBP) more or less coincide. This anomaly is reﬂected in Figure 5, where we
plot the diﬀerential employment growth rate (between initially large and small ﬁrms) against
the unemployment rate, both detrended. The behavior of the growth rate is quite unusual
in 1977-1978, suggesting serious data issues of unknown nature. Because CBP is a true and
tested dataset while BDS is a new resource that is currently undergoing some revisions, but
is immune from reclassiﬁcation, we begin our analysis in 1979, since when CBP and BDS
coincide. Fortunately, 1977 and 1978 are not recession years, and we lose little in terms of
cyclical variability in the economy.
Second, all the evidence presented in this subsection was constructed from BDS data
based on “ﬁrm counts”, as deﬁned in Subsection 2.4, meaning that entering ﬁrms were
excluded from the JC count, while entering establishments created within continuing ﬁrms
were kept in. An alternate option is to use data based on “establishment counts” (again,
see Subsection 2.4), which exclude all new establishments from the JC count. Diﬀerences
between the two options are generally minor, as exempliﬁed in Figure 6, which replicates
Figure 3 using the establishment count.
We now dig deeper and check whether the basic Fact 2 that we uncover, that initially
larger ﬁrms have more cyclically sensitive employment, holds within or across geographical
locations, industries and age of the ﬁrm. One important proviso is that in BDS the state and
industry refer to the establishment, and the initial size to the parent company. It is of course
impossible to attribute a state and industry to most large ﬁrms that have establishments in
many states and industries. These ﬁrms, though, will weigh more because their many and
diverse establishments will be all attributed to the large ﬁrm size category, wherever they
are and whatever they produce. Unfortunately, cross-tabulations by two or three of such
criteria, such as net JC by initial ﬁrm size, within each industry and each state, is not usable
because too many observations are suppressed for conﬁdentiality reasons. We can, however,
perform the analysis within each of these categories, one at a time, in addition to initial ﬁrm
size. We begin with industries and continue with geographical units.
7Although CBP is based on the same basic source data as BDS, diﬀerences in how the source data
are processed lead to diﬀerences in the published statistics. For details, see the BDS technical note avail-
able at www.ces.census.gov/docs/bds/BDS Technical%20Note 102008-1.doc, in which the discrepancies































Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.



































Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 6: Diﬀerential growth, based on establishment counts
203.1.3 Industry Patterns
One natural question is whether the more pronounced cyclical sensitivity of large employers
just reﬂects a larger cyclical sensitivity of sectors, like manufacturing, that have above-
average ﬁrm and establishment size. That is, our main ﬁnding may be due to a composition
eﬀect. We would like to emphasize that, even if true, this fact would not diminish the novelty
and interest of our ﬁnding, although it may appear less surprising in light of what we already
know about the ﬁrm size and cyclical sensitivity of diﬀerent sectors. But it turns out that
the higher cyclical sensitivity of large employers is, by and large, a phenomenon that occurs
within, and not between, industries.
Industries
Construction −.589 TCPU −.369
FIRE −.566 Services −.36
Retail Trade −.534 Agric., Forestry, Fishing −.262
Manufacturing −.41 Mining −.229
Wholesale Trade −.387 All −.61
Table 2: Industry-level correlations between average unemployment over past year and dif-
ferential ﬁrm growth, based on ﬁrm counts
We maintain our classiﬁcation in nine broad sectors, which is reasonably consistent
through the changeover from SIC to NAICS in 1998.8 In Figure 7 we plot again the dif-
ferential growth rate of (initially) large minus small ﬁrms in each broad sector against the
civilian unemployment rate, both detrended.9 The within-industry variability of the growth
rate diﬀerential is now much larger and swamps visually that of the unemployment rate.
Nonetheless, the pattern emerges also within most sectors, including the larger ones. In
Table 2, we report the correlations, which are all negative.
8One slightly puzzling piece of information on industry coverage in the Economic Census, which is
as mentioned the source of the BR, CBP and BDS data every ﬁve years, is in the following document:
www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec02-00r-hist.pdf#page=171,. “The 1992 Economic Census covered retail
trade; wholesale trade; service industries; transportation, communications, and utilities; ﬁnance, insurance,
and real estate; construction industries, manufactures, and mineral industries; and the TIU.S.. [...] By in-
cluding coverage of ﬁnancial, insurance, real estate industries, communications, and utilities, the 1992 census
marked the most signiﬁcant expansion of the census in half a century. [...] Altogether, the 1992 Economic
Census covered approximately 95 new industries, expanding coverage to approximately 98 percent of the
nations economic activity. [Coverage of the 1987 Economic Census was approximately 75 percent of the
nation’s economic activity.]”
9The small and large ﬁrm cutoﬀs are set here to <50 and >500 employees for all industries. Similar plots
using the ﬁrst and third quantiles of the average (over the entire period) ﬁrm size distribution within each
sector as cutoﬀs — to allow diﬀerentiation of sectors that have exceedingly high average establishment size,















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22In Figure 8 we show the results of the reverse exercise. We classify and rank sectors by
mean ﬁrm size over the period. Then we calculate the employment growth of the largest
three sectors and that of the smallest three, and take the diﬀerence. This is a between-
industry measure of employment reallocation from sectors that have on average larger or
smaller employers. The cyclical pattern disappears. The relative growth diﬀerential has an




















Solid = Between−industry differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year based on cumulated employment shares of industries, ranked by
mean firm size.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 8: Diﬀerential growth, between industries
3.1.4 Geographical Patterns
We associate to each Census division and U.S. state the corresponding local civilian unem-
ployment rate from the BLS, and correlate the diﬀerential ﬁrm (large minus small) growth
rate and the detrended local unemployment rate. Figure 9 reports the time series of ﬁrm
size diﬀerential growth rates and detrended unemployment rates within each U.S. Census
division. The correlations are reported in Table 3. Table 4 reports the same correlations for
all U.S. states. Both the ﬁgure and the tables show clearly that the phenomenon that we
identify takes place within states and regions, and it is not driven by employment moving
from locations with small ﬁrms to locations with large ﬁrms in a boom, and vice versa in
recessions.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mountain −.595 Paciﬁc −.274
South Atlantic −.574 West North Central −.269
East South Central −.49 New England −.087
Middle Atlantic −.354 West South Central −.043
East North Central −.298 All −.61
Table 3: Division-level correlations between average unemployment over past year and dif-
ferential ﬁrm growth
North Carolina −.601 New York −.276
Kansas −.566 South Dakota −.252
Georgia −.554 Missouri −.205
Colorado −.532 Nevada −.198
Idaho −.511 Washington −.182
Virginia −.478 Oregon −.174
South Carolina −.453 Indiana −.163
Arkansas −.449 Vermont −.158
Iowa −.437 Massachusetts −.117
Kentucky −.404 District of Columbia −.111
Florida −.397 Hawaii −.105
Pennsylvania −.392 New Hampshire −.084
Alabama −.388 Maine −.074
Mississippi −.372 Nebraska −.056
New Jersey −.365 Texas −.056
Utah −.356 New Mexico −.041
Wisconsin −.353 Montana −.033
Illinois −.348 Arizona −.03
North Dakota −.339 Michigan −.003
California −.332 Ohio .009
Minnesota −.32 Louisiana .028
Connecticut −.311 Delaware .037
Maryland −.31 West Virginia .056
Tennessee −.303 Rhode Island .07
Alaska −.301 Oklahoma .095
Wyoming .339
Table 4: State-level correlations between average unemployment over past year and diﬀer-
ential ﬁrm growth
Fact 3. The higher cyclical sensitivity of large employers holds principally within
industries and within States, not between those units.
253.1.5 Firm Age Rather than Size
Recent work on business micro data (e.g. Foster et al., 2008) as well established theories of
ﬁrm dynamics (Jovanovic, 1982) point to age as a major predictor of ﬁrm behavior. Older





























Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as less than 5 and over 10 years of age.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 10: Diﬀerential growth, based on ﬁrm age
Figure 10 plots the diﬀerential growth rate of initially (the year before) old and young
ﬁrms (old minus young) against the detrended unemployment rate. Two aspects of the
data emerge clearly. First, heterogeneity by age over the cycle is very large, as unemploy-
ment ﬂuctuations are now barely visible. Second, older ﬁrms are hit hardest by recessions.
Interestingly, the relative growth rate by initial ﬁrm age leads the business cycle.
3.2 Business Employment Dynamics (BED)
A diﬀerent source of information on the distribution of employment by employer size is avail-
able from the Business Employment Dynamics program at the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This program collects information accruing from the States’ unemployment insurance pro-
grams. The dataset only begins in 1992, but its frequency is quarterly. As the name suggests,
the BED is primarily a dataset of job ﬂows. Although the classiﬁcation is dynamic, thus still
subject to the Reclassiﬁcation Bias (see Section 2), the small bias found in BDS (documented
26below in Section 4) suggests that valuable information is contained also in BED’s ﬂows by
reclassiﬁed size. The BED has the dual advantage over the BDS of a quarterly frequency



























Solid = Net JC rate, large firms (MA smoothed), Dash = Net JC rate, small firms (MA smoothed).
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BED and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 11: Net job creation rates
Figure 11 plots the net JC rate of large and small ﬁrms, according to the usual size cutoﬀs,
and NBER dates.10 The higher cyclical volatility of large ﬁrms jumps out. In Figure 12 we
take the diﬀerence in these growth rates and plot it against the detrended unemployment
rate. The two series mirror each other, correlation −0.76. Figure 13 decomposes the net
ﬂows of Figure 11 into diﬀerential gross JC and diﬀerential JD, large minus small ﬁrms.
Clearly, excess JC by large employers accounts for their faster net growth in the late 1990s,
while a spike in JD by large employers explains their slump in the 2001 recession. The
message from these BLS data is the same that we obtained in the Census BDS data.
3.3 Compustat
Longitudinal links in BDS are valid only for one year, on a rolling basis. Proper longitudinal
business data allow to ﬁx a ﬁrm’s identity once and for all at a common date and follow its
10Recall that the denominator in the published BED job ﬂow rates is the average L
(1/2)
it−1 in the notation
of Section 2, i.e. average employment in the size class between quarters t−1 and t. This is slightly diﬀerent
from initial employment in the size class, L
(0)



































Solid = Differential net job creation (MA−smoothed), Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BED and authors’ calculations.
































Solid = Differential gross JC (MA smoothed), Dash = Differential gross JD (MA smoothed).
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BED and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 13: Diﬀerential gross job ﬂows
growth over a long period of time including several business cycles, as a function of its initial
size. Since all ﬁrms in existence start from size 0, the initial date cannot be too far back in
28time, but certainly more than the one year of BDS can be helpful.
The only fully longitudinal U.S. business dataset that we have been able to access is
Compustat (see below for other countries.) This comprises only public companies, so it
is not a representative sample, like BDS. Yet, it contains useful information. Figure 14 is
reported from MPV08. We ﬁx ﬁrm identities in 1975 and classify them once and for all in
size bins (by employment), large above 5,000 employees, and small otherwise. The reason
for the large size cutoﬀ is that public companies are very large. Then, for each year from
1976 to 2005 (these are starting years, so the same 1977-2006 period covered by the BDS
where these are ending years), we calculate the growth rate of employment over the past year
at (initially, in 1975) large ﬁrms and subtract the growth rate of the other, initially small
ﬁrms in the sample. We plot this diﬀerence in growth rates, in a way that mimics Figure
3. Consistent with the patterns uncovered in BDS and BED, over four consecutive business
cycles this diﬀerence in growth rates is procyclical, and crosses zero when the labor market
turns tight, except for an outlier in 1987.
This analysis highlights one diﬃcult issue that unavoidably arises with fully longitudinal
datasets. As explained above, the advantage is that we can ﬁx the identities of a given
group of ﬁrms and then track them over a long time period. This allows us to prevent
reclassiﬁcation and that new entrants change the composition of the sample. But the eﬀect
of exit cannot be eliminated. Figure 14 only includes public companies that survived through
1976-2005, so there is a strong survivorship bias. If we tracked all companies that were listed
in 1976, we would then be losing some of them along the way to delisting and bankruptcy,
so we would allow only for job destruction from exit and not for job creation from entry.
This fact works in favor of using short longitudinal links as in BDS.11
4 The Distribution of Employment by Employer Size
over the Business Cycle
We continue our data analysis with the cyclical behavior of the distribution of employment
across size classes of their employers, ﬁrms or establishments. As discussed in Subsection 2.3,
the growth rate of the employment share of a given size class only approximates the growth
rate of employment in the set of ﬁrms initially in that size class, which is our main object
of interest, up to the Reclassiﬁcation Bias. We ﬁnd it useful, however, to report evidence
11In the NBER Manufacturing Panel from Compustat, ﬁxing ﬁrm sizes in 1975, the diﬀerence in growth
rates of employment between ﬁrms in the top quartile and ﬁrms below the median has the now familiar
pattern throughout 1975-1995: falling in recessions and gradually climbing in expansions. This is true
whether we deﬁne size in terms of initial employment, sales, capital or assets. We thank David Berger for



































Differential firm size growth: over 5,000 minus under 5,000 employees.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: COMPUSTAT North American Files and authors’ calculations.





































Solid = Differential growth of employment shares, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000, without correction for reclassification.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BDS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 15: Diﬀerential growth of employment shares, BDS data
on changes in the employment distribution from repeated cross-sections, both to gauge the
30magnitude of the Reclassiﬁcation Bias and because the data required to construct employ-
ment shares are much more widely available across countries than longitudinal data such
as BDS that make it possible to correct for reclassiﬁcation. We provide some international
evidence towards the end of the paper.
4.1 Using BDS Data to Quantitatively Assess the Reclassiﬁcation
Bias
The BDS dataset reports job ﬂows and employment growth in each year t by initial (year-
t − 1) size. It is therefore immune to the Reclassiﬁcation Bias as it conveys longitudinal
information over two year-periods [t − 1,t] about size classes, the composition of which is
ﬁxed over the entire period. However the same BDS dataset also allows construction of
employment shares of size classes each year. We can thus repeat the exercise of subsection
3.1.2 only using diﬀerences in the growth rates of employment shares across size classes.
Although this methodology is incorrect (because subject to the Reclassiﬁcation Bias — see
Subsection 2.3), a comparison with the correct one illustrated in Subsection 3.1.2 can help
us gauge the quantitative relevance of the Reclassiﬁcation Bias, as formally measured by the
third term in equation (1).
Figure 15 parallels the aggregate picture of the cyclical behavior of diﬀerential ﬁrm growth
across size classes drawn earlier in Figure 3, and shows that the message is essentially un-
changed when one neglects the reclassiﬁcation issue. Although the correlation is slightly
more negative in Figure 15 than in Figure 3, as we would expect because of reclassiﬁcation
which pushes more ﬁrms in, hence imputes more growth to, the large ﬁrm size categories
when the economy grows and unemployment is low in booms, and vice versa in recessions,
the bias appears to be quantitatively very modest.
Fact 4. Reclassiﬁcation plays a quantitatively negligible part in explaining the
higher cyclical sensitivity of large employers.
4.2 BED
While the BED data contains only job ﬂows, in levels and rate (as a fraction of average size
over the quarter, L
(1/2)
it−1 ), also by ﬁrm size, we have obtained from the BLS an unpublished
tabulation of the time series of employment, establishment and ﬁrm counts by initial size of
the ﬁrm, for the whole U.S. economy (no breakdown by location or industry), in 1992:III-
2008:I. As for BDS we detrend employment share growth rates and correlate the deviations
from trend with those of the unemployment rate, at the same quarterly frequency. The
results, depicted on Figure 16, corroborate our previous ﬁndings from BDS: the negative
31correlation is again very strong, at −0.77. Although that correlation is likely to overstate the
true diﬀerence in cyclical sensitivity of large and small employers, due to the Reclassiﬁcation



































Solid = Differential growth of employment shares, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000, without correction for reclassification.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: BED and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 16: Diﬀerential growth of employment shares, BED data
5 Worker Flows by Employer Size over the Business
Cycle
In order to shed more light on the underlying sources of the cyclical movement in employment
shares and growth rates by ﬁrm size, we now turn to worker ﬂows. A group of ﬁrms of similar
initial size can add employment by either adding more jobs (higher JC) or shedding fewer
(lower JD). Both are changes on the extensive margin in the number of ﬁrms in the group
that gain and lose employment. In turn, the intensity of each individual ﬁrm JC or JD can
vary. Furthermore, the status of a ﬁrm as a net creator or destroyer of jobs can change in
diﬀerent ways. In particular, the ﬁrm can hire more or fewer workers, for given attrition,
or separations might increase, for given inﬂow. Finally, among separations, some originate
from outside opportunities that the ﬁrm cannot counter, such as outside oﬀers to its workers
and voluntary quits to non-employment. Other separations such as layoﬀs, are originated
by the ﬁrm due to poor business conditions. In this section, we aim to shed some light
on which of these mechanisms are at play behind the cyclical behavior of the growth/size
32relationship that we uncovered. The need for information on worker ﬂows by employer size
at high frequency restricts the available time span in existing datasets. However we ﬁnd
that, in the tight labor market of the late 1990s, large employers grew faster in part because
they poached more employees than their smaller competitors, hence had an additional source
of hires (beyond unemployment) they could draw from. Conversely, in the 2001 recession
layoﬀs at large employers, as measured by mass layoﬀs, spiked much more than layoﬀs at
large in the economy.
5.1 Sources of New Hires over the Business Cycle
We report from MPV08 evidence on where do new workers join employers of diﬀerent sizes
at diﬀerent stages of a business cycles. In that paper, we argue that the reason for the faster
growth of small ﬁrms in loose labor market and of large ﬁrms in a tight one is related to
the ease with which new hires can be found among the unemployed. When these abound,
all employers hire and grow at a rate that depends on their sampling weight in job search.
When unemployment grows scarce, large employers, which are typically more productive (in
revenue terms) and higher paying, can more easily poach employees from smaller competitors.
So they can keep growing their employment through that channel, and smaller employers
are out of luck and their growth is curbed, in relative terms.
We corroborate this hypothesis with evidence from publicly available data from the Cen-
sus’ Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).12 SIPP contains information about
the workforce size of an individual’s current employer (employing establishment), as well as
individual job histories, with 4-year long worker longitudinal links and weekly information on
employment status. This allows a crude analysis of the poaching activity of establishments
as a function of their size. Figure 17 plots a measure of the fraction of new hires coming from
another employer (i.e. following an employer-to-employer transition) for three categories of
hiring establishment size.13 In other words, it plots a measure of the importance of poaching
in the recruitment activity of establishments, by size of the hiring establishment. Changes
in the design of the SIPP and other data limitations restrict the period over which that
indicator can be constructed to the years shown on Figure 17. While this admittedly con-
stitutes very limited evidence, we still notice the following two points. First, poaching was
more intense in the latter half of the 1990s expansion than in the immediate aftermath of
the 2001 recession. This is true for all three categories of establishment size. Second, larger
establishments almost always poach more than smaller ones. This diﬀerence in “poaching
12Information about the SIPP, as well as data ﬁles are available at www.bls.census.gov/sipp/.
13Speciﬁcally, it is constructed as the fraction of workers who have changed employers in the previous year
and are now employed at an establishment in size category X without work interruption among all workers
having changed employers in the previous year and now employed at an establishment in size category X.
33intensity”, however, is more pronounced in 1997-1999, when the labor market turns tight,

























Fraction of new hires coming from other employers, by establishment size category.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: SIPP and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 17: Poaching and establishment size
5.2 Layoﬀs
We do not have access to micro business data on gross separations by size of the employer.
One important component of separations is layoﬀs. The BLS provides two sources of in-
formation that we can use to assess whether large employers lay oﬀ (proportionally) more
workers in recessions.
The Mass Layoﬀ Statistics (MLS) available starting in 1995, record the number of
episodes and the total number of workers involved each month in layoﬀs involving more
than 50 workers simultaneously. This is broken down by state and 3-digit industry.14
The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), starting in December 2000,
records (among others) layoﬀs for a sample of ﬁrms, also broken down by region and broad
industry groups.
14“A mass layoﬀ occurs when at least 50 initial UI claims are ﬁled against an establishment during a
consecutive 5-week period. An extended mass layoﬀ occurs when at least 50 initial claims are ﬁled against
an establishment during a consecutive 5-week period and at least 50 workers have been separated from jobs























Solid = Mass layoffs, Dash = Total layoffs, Dash−dot = Total layoffs, adjusted.
All series seasonally adjusted, in percentage deviation from trend.
Solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs)
Source: JOLTS, MLS, Davis et al. (2008), and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 18: Mass layoﬀs vs. all layoﬀs
By comparing layoﬀs at large establishments (MLS), which can only belong to medium-
to-large ﬁrms, with layoﬀs at all employers (JOLTS), we can check whether in the 2001
recession and again in 2008 MLS layoﬀs rise faster than layoﬀs in general. Figure 18 leaves
no doubt that mass layoﬀs are wildly more volatile and concentrated in recessions than layoﬀs
at large.15 Large employers shrink more in recessions in part because they lay oﬀ a larger
proportion of their payroll, not (only) because they hire fewer or lose more workers to quits.
6 International Evidence
Business micro or semi-aggregated data (by employer size) on employment are available in
many countries. We now present evidence of the following, ﬁnal stylized fact:
Fact 5. The higher cyclical sensitivity of large employers is a phenomenon that
is not unique to the U.S.. It is common to various countries, of diﬀerent sizes
and stages of development.
15JOLTS has been shown to have problems in that it severely undersamples small and young establish-
ments, thus generating too small turnover rates (Davis et al., 2008). This makes the JOLTS sample biased
towards large employers. For us it is not a problem, because if JOLTS and MLS show a diﬀerence than a
fortiori the real universe of layoﬀs must be even more diﬀerent than MLS. At any rate, Figure 18 plots both
the original JOLTS data and the amended data from Davis et al. (2008b).
35A large empirical literature has tested in several countries the well-known hypothesis that
the distribution of ﬁrm size can be well approximated by a Pareto distribution, that is, the
log rank of an employer in the overall size distribution is linearly related to the log of its size.
The employment size distribution counts the shares of employers (ﬁrms or establishments)
in each size class, rather than the shares of employment. But there is a strict relationship
between the two, as employment in a size class is the average size in that class times the
share of employers. While most of this literature focuses on cross-sectional patterns, either
at one point in time or on average over some time period, a few articles do present and
comment on time series of the cross-sectional evidence. In particular, a power law is ﬁtted
to cross-sectional data year by year, which allows to study the cyclical behavior of the
intercept and slope of the power law. We found that the growth rate of the employment
shares of large size classes is procyclical relative to small classes, so we should expect the
size distribution of employers to be more heavily weighted on large ones, hence to be more
unequal, when unemployment is low, and vice versa. This implies that the Pareto slope
should be countercyclical, yielding a ﬂatter power law and a more unequal size distribution
in booms, and a steeper law in recessions. This is exactly what the literature has found (e.g.,
Marsili (2006) in the Dutch manufacturing sector, Delli Gatti et al. (2006) in a large sample
of Italian ﬁrms), although it has failed to draw its further implications, that is, to make the
connection and take the further step to the cyclicality of the size/growth relationship.
6.1 Employer Growth by Initial Size over the Business Cycle
For two countries (viz. Denmark and Brazil), we have been able to access full longitudinal
business microdata on employment from censuses for an extended period of time allowing
us to replicate the exercises that we performed for the U.S. with BDS and Compustat. In
both cases we compute the diﬀerential growth rate between initially large and small ﬁrms,
where “initially” refers either to the year before or to a given year, ﬁxed once and for all at
the beginning of the sample. In both cases, the business micro data that we exploit have
been matched to information on the employees, an important dimension that we will exploit
in future research.
6.1.1 Denmark
The Danish register-based matched employer-employee dataset IDA (Integreret Database for
Arbejdsmarkedsforskning — Integrated Database for Labor Market Research) contains basic
socio-economic information collected annually in the last week of November on workers,





























Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <20 and >500.
Source: IDA, OECD and authors’ calculations.
































Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <20 and >500.
Source: IDA, OECD and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 20: Diﬀerential growth, Danish private companies classiﬁed by size in 1981.
the entire Danish population aged 16 to 69.16 As a part of the IDA programme, Statistics
Denmark maintains an employer-level panel which contains all the basic information on
37employers (essentially deﬁned by a tax identiﬁer), including workforce size in the last week
of November. The current panel length is 22 years, from 1980 to 2002, and the sample that
we use excludes public-sector and not-for-proﬁt employers.
Being a panel of employers, the IDA ﬁrm ﬁle enables us to assign any particular employer
to a ﬁxed size class for as many years as we like. It is possible, in particular, to replicate the
structure of the U.S. BDS data, where ﬁrms are assigned to a ﬁxed size class over rolling two-
year windows. This is what we do in Figure 19, which plots for 1981-2003 the (detrended)
OECD unemployment rate and growth rate of large minus small ﬁrms, where size is ﬁxed
a year in advance, as in the BDS. The familiar pattern emerges: initially large employers
grow faster when unemployment is unusually low, and vice versa. The correlation between
the two series is −.46.
As an alternative, the Danish employer panel also enables us to ﬁx the composition of size
classes once and for all, as we did for the U.S. with the Compustat sample (see Subsection
3.3). In Figure 20 we allocate ﬁrms to the two size classes in 1983 and track the relative
growth rate of these two groups over the following 20 years, without ever reclassifying them.
While the two series are overall negatively correlated again (−0.5), the pattern is clearest
in 1983-1993, and then appears more blurred in the second half, 1993-2003. This is not too
surprising, and we do not take it as contradictory evidence, as ﬁrm sizes are not perennial
and signiﬁcant reshuﬄing occurs over decades.
Our underlying theoretical framework considers size mostly as an indirect measure of
productivity, based on the amply documented positive relationship between employment
size and revenue-based measures of productivity. Another robust relationship is between
average wages paid by a ﬁrm and size. For this Danish dataset, both relationships have
been conﬁrmed by Lentz and Mortensen (2008). Since IDA contains wage information, we
also consider initial wage, rather than initial size, as a measure of undelying productivity.
It is plausible that wages reﬂect productivity better than size, especially for young ﬁrms
that are still in their initial growth phase. In Figure 21 we allocate ﬁrms once and for all to
low- and high-paying bins according to mean wage earned by their employees in 1981. We
then compute, detrend and plot with the detrended unemployment rate the growth rate of
employment at initially high- and low-paying ﬁrms, where the former are on average larger.
Now the pattern holds strikingly well through the 1980s and 1990s, until 2003. Indeed, except
for the very ﬁrst two years, the two series mirror each other almost perfectly (correlation
−0.76).


























Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories based on mean wage in 1981 and defined as <DKK 58,000/year and >DKK 83,000/year.
Source: IDA, OECD and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 21: Diﬀerential growth, Danish private companies classiﬁed by mean wage in 1981.
6.1.2 Brazil
We exploit longitudinal information on Brazilian employers in the formal sector from the
labor market census RAIS (Rela¸ c˜ ao Annual de Informa¸ c˜ oes Sociais). This is an adminis-
trative dataset collected annually by the Brazilian labor ministry, which includes all ﬁrms
in the Brazilian formal sector and provides information for all their workers. The ministry
collects demographic information for workers, such as age, education and sex, some informa-
tion about establishments, such as sector and location, and provides information about the
job, such as the average wage earned during that year, the wage in December, the average
number of hours worked, occupation, dates of admission and separation, type of contract,
causes for separation.17
17Access to RAIS is restricted to authorized researchers. Carlos Corseuil of IPEA performed the data









Solid = Differential net job creation, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <50 and >1000.
Source: IPEA.
Fig. 22: Diﬀerential growth by ﬁrm size ﬁxed in 1995, RAIS census of Brazilian employers.
We allocate ﬁrms to the familiar size bins in 1995 and track the growth rate of employment
in the two groups over the subsequent 10 years. As done before for the U.S. and Denmark, in
Figure 22 we plot the detrended diﬀerential growth rate of employment at initially (in 1995)
large minus small ﬁrms and the detrended unemployment rate. The correlation is clearly
negative after 1997. Most vividly, the harsh blow suﬀered by the Brazilian economy in 1998
as a consequence of the Asian crisis hits the larger ﬁrms hardest: it generates a sharp rise in
the unemployment rate and a corresponding drop in the relative employment growth of ﬁrms
that started out larger. As the shock is re-absorbed and the unemployment rate declines to
more normal levels, the diﬀerential growth of employment in large ﬁrms nicely recovers. The
initial 1995-1996 increase in the unemployment rate, which works against Fact 5, reﬂects
in part structural, rather than cyclical, factors. Estimates of the proportion of Brazilian
workers in the informal sector are declining before the Asian crisis, while unemployment
rises. After the crisis, this decline in the informal sector grinds to a halt.
6.2 The Distribution of Employment by Employer Size over the
Business Cycle
The type of data of easiest access is the distribution of employment among employers of
diﬀerent sizes. Although this is only indirect evidence, as shown in previous sections the























Solid = Differential growth of employment shares, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate
Categories defined each year as <20 and >249, without correction for reclassification.
Source: UK Small Business Administration, ONS, and authors’ calculations.






























Solid = Differential growth of employment shares, Dash = HP−detrended unemployment rate.
Categories defined each year as <20 and >500.
Source: Statistics Canada (Business Dynamics in Canada), OECD, and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 24: Diﬀerential growth of employment shares, Canada
underlying pattern of growth by initial size. We present evidence from other countries that
the growth rate of the employment share of large employers is indeed procyclical. This
41exercise can probably be replicated in many other countries using publicly available data.
6.2.1 United Kingdom
The UK Small Business Administration publishes a table of employment shares by classes
of ﬁrm size at annual frequency. We found on the web data for 1994-2006. The size cutoﬀs
are <20 and >249 employees. We compute and detrend employment share growth rates
and plot the cross-size-class diﬀerence thereof against the detrended UK unemployment rate
(from the UK Oﬃce of National Statistics). The correlation between those two series over
the 1994-2006 observation period is −0.24, smaller in absolute value than what we found for
other countries but still clearly negative, as visually clear on Figure 23.
6.2.2 Canada
As a part of its report on “Business Dynamics in Canada” (see Kanagarajah, 2003), Statistics
Canada has compiled annual employment shares by ﬁrm size categories over the two decades
1983-2003.18 The largest size category available is 500. From these data, we can compute
employment growth rates, with reclassiﬁcation and including entrants. In Figure 24 we
plot the diﬀerential growth rate (>500 employees minus <20 employees) against detrended
unemployment (from the OECD), and we ﬁnd the usual negative correlation, in this case
equal to −0.43.
7 A Firm-Ladder Model of Employer Size Dynamics
We now sketch a simple model of ﬁrm employment dynamics that can help to shed some
light on the empirical patterns that we have documented. Intentionally very stylized, this
model is meant to illustrate what we have argued in other work is an important mechanism
in labor markets. We refer to our theoretical work (MPV08, MPV09) for more details.
Let ut denote the unemployment rate at (continuous) time t. Let δt denote the sepa-
ration rate and λ0t the job-ﬁnding rate from unemployment. Assume constant labor force
participation. The equation
˙ ut = δt (1 − ut) − λ0tut
is called a “bathtub” model. As in a bathtub the inﬂow of water from the faucet and the
outﬂow from the drain determine the level of the water line, so the inﬂow into unemployment,
equal to the separation rate δt times the employment rate 1−ut, and the outﬂow, equal to the
18Visit www.statcan.gc.ca/bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?catno=61-534-XWE&lang=eng for details.
42job-ﬁnding rate λ0t times the unemployment rate, determine the change in the unemployment
rate.
We propose a “ﬁrm ladder” model. Workers can search randomly on and oﬀ the job and
receive oﬀers at rates λ1t and λ0t respectively. When unemployed, a worker accepts any oﬀers.
When employed and confronted with an outside oﬀer, a worker always chooses one of the
two ﬁrms, according to a ranking that all workers agree upon. That is, if any worker prefers
working for any ﬁrm A over any ﬁrm B, so do all other workers, and thus any A employee
will reject oﬀers from B and any B employee will accept oﬀers from A. Additionally, some
worker lose jobs from all rungs of the ﬁrm ladder and become unemployed, as in the bathtub
model, so this is a slippery ladder, while the unemployed ﬁnd ﬁrms randomly.
Let θ ∈ [0,1] denote a ﬁrm’s rank in the unanimous worker ordering, and Lt (θ) its
employment size, that we treat as a continuous variable. Normalize the measure of active
ﬁrms to 1. Assume that, conditional on making a contact with another ﬁrm, the probability
of sampling a ﬁrm with rank below θ, either from employment or unemployment, is Q(θ), a
proper cdf with density q. Applying a law of large number at the individual ﬁrm level, the
size of ﬁrm Lt (θ) evolves according to







The outﬂow from the ﬁrm occurs at rate δ to unemployment and at rate λ1t, the contact
rate on the job, times 1−Q(θ), the probability of sampling a higher-ranked ﬁrm. The inﬂow
occurs at rate λ0t from unemployment and at rate λ1t from other ﬁrms, and a measure
  θ
0 Lt (x)dx are employed by lower-ranked ﬁrms and move to θ. In either type of inﬂow,
workers contact a ﬁrm of rank θ, conditional on making a contact, with “chance” q(θ).
This is a Partial Diﬀerential Equation in time and rank, with a given initial condition
L0 (θ) which describes the initial distribution of ﬁrm size by preference ranking. Notice that
this pins down also initial unemployment u0 = 1 −
 
L0 (θ)dθ. If the arrival rates λit are
constant over time, as shown in MPV08, this PDE has the solution
Lt (θ) = e
−{δ+λ1[1−Q(θ)]}t
 







[1 + λ1 (t − s)Q(θ)]use
{δ+λ1[1−Q(θ)]}sds
 
which converges to a steady state distribution




{δ + λ1 [1 − Q(θ)]}
2.
Now suppose that L0 (θ) < L∞ (θ) for all θ. That is, the economy starts “depressed” and
all ﬁrms grow in size, while unemployment falls. At what relative pace do ﬁrms of diﬀerent
43ranks grow? In other words, is the growth rate of employment by given rank ˙ Lt (θ)/Lt (θ)
increasing or decreasing in rank?
The natural application to our setting is as follows. Let θ denote a ﬁrm-speciﬁc produc-
tivity parameter, ﬁxed over time, and assume that L0 (θ) is increasing in θ. That is, more
productive ﬁrms start out bigger. Then, given the assumed worker preference ordering over
employers, this initial ranking is never reversed. In MPV08 we calibrate the parameters
of this PDE (λ0,λ1,δ,L0 and Q) to match stylized facts about worker turnover (to/from
unemployment and job-to-job) and the distribution of employment by size coming out of a
recession (L0), but not the evolution of ﬁrm sizes. When we compute the resulting path of
Lt (θ), we ﬁnd that initially larger, preferred ﬁrms converge more slowly to their steady state
size. As we observe in the data, the relative growth rate of initially large minus small ﬁrms
increases from a minimum after a trough to the following peak.
The intuition is simple. All ﬁrms have access to an inﬂow from unemployment that is
independent of ﬁrm size. This inﬂow declines over time with unemployment. As the size of
small ﬁrms grows, the pool of workers that can be poached also rises. While initially small,
lower ranked ﬁrms cannot poach much and soon lose their hiring pool of unemployed, larger,
higher ranked ﬁrms compensate this shortfall with an increasing inﬂow of job-to-job quits
from lower ﬁrms. See MPV08 for quantitative results.
In MPV08, MPV09 we rationalize these dynamics in the equilibrium of a dynamic large
game where ﬁrms diﬀer by productivity θ and post employment contracts, which can be
summarized by a time-varying continuation utility promised and delivered to the worker. If
more productive ﬁrms start out larger, they have two incentives to make better oﬀers: they
have more to lose from not producing, and they have more workers to lose to competitors.
Therefore, more productive ﬁrms always oﬀer more and attract workers from less produc-
tive ones, which rationalizes our preference ordering over employers. This Rank-Preserving
Equilibrium is generic under weak assumptions, and generates the dynamic described above.
In our quantitative exercise, wages are also increasing in productivity, thus in size. Hence,
ranking ﬁrms by initial productivity or size makes little diﬀerence to predict the timing of
growth, as we indeed ﬁnd in the Danish data. In MPV09, simulations from a stochastic
model with aggregate productivity shocks generate patterns that are qualitatively consistent
with our empirical ﬁndings both in booms and slumps. More productive, larger ﬁrms are
more cyclically sensitive.
448 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show evidence that large employers are more cyclically sensitive. This
pattern is robust to a variety of measures of relative employment growth, employer size and
classiﬁcation by size, treatments of entry and exit of ﬁrms and establishments, industry,
geographical and ﬁrm age breakdowns. Evidence on gross job ﬂows and on worker ﬂows by
employer size depicts a coherent picture of labor market dynamics. Very similar patterns
are observed in other, quite diverse countries.
We conclude by illustrating our research agenda. Although the datasets that we have
explored are of high quality in terms of contents, coverage, accuracy, and duration, there
is always scope for improvement. First, there is an issue of time span. The main datasets,
BDS and BED, cannot be extended back in time given the availability of underlying micro
data. Repeated cross-sections like CBP are available in archival form for the post-war period,
but not every year. Alternative sources that extend over longer periods cover only speciﬁc
sectors. Second, ﬁner industry-level analysis appears infeasible because of the 1997 transition
from SIC to NAICS. Third, micro business data underlying BDS (the Longitudinal Business
Database at the Census Bureau) and BED (at the Bureau of Labor Statistics) would let
us replicate our analysis of Compustat, Denmark, and Brazil, allocate ﬁrms to size classes
once and for all and track their growth over decades. We discussed the pros and cons of this
approach. Additionally, information at the establishment level on ﬁrm wages, assets, sales,
intermediate inputs would allow us to verify whether employer size is really capturing some
measure of productivity. Finally, matched employer-employee longitudinal datasets like IDA
from Denmark can help us better gauge the ﬁrm-speciﬁc component of wages that attracts
workers to speciﬁc employers, as well as connect directly worker and job ﬂows.
From a conceptual viewpoint, the data require a theoretical framework to make sense
of the patterns that we uncover. Indeed, even our measurement is strongly inﬂuenced by
our theoretical work in MPV08 and MPV09. There, we identify a ‘ﬁrm’ with a wage policy,
and we base our explanation of the facts on competition for workers among heterogeneous
ﬁrms in frictional labor markets. Alternative deﬁnitions of a ﬁrm, based on technology (scale
of operation, capital adjustment costs), span of control, borrowing constraints, and others,
can be similarly embedded in an equilibrium framework to produce predictions that can be
confronted with our facts.
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